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Abstract—Botnet is one of the major threats to computer
security. In previous botnet command and control (C&C) sce-
narios using online social networks (OSNs), methods for finding
botmasters (e.g. ids, links, DGAs, etc.) are hardcoded into bots.
Once a bot is reverse engineered, botmaster is exposed. Mean-
while, abnormal contents from explicit commands may expose
botmaster and raise anomalies on OSNs. To overcome these
deficiencies, we propose an AI-powered covert C&C channel.
On leverage of neural networks, bots can find botmasters by
avatars, which are converted into feature vectors. Commands are
embedded into normal contents (e.g. tweets, comments, etc.) using
text data augmentation and hash collision. Experiment on Twitter
shows that the command-embedded contents can be generated
efficiently, and bots can find botmaster and obtain commands
accurately. By demonstrating how AI may help promote a covert
communication on OSNs, this work provides a new perspective
on botnet detection and confrontation.
Index Terms—Online Social Networks, Command and Control,
Convert Communication, Neural Networks, Artificial Intelligence
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnet is one of the most primary and serious threats
in computer security today. A botnet refers to a group of
compromised computers that are remotely controlled by a
botmaster via command and control (C&C) channels [1].
Based on botnets, multiple types of cyber attacks can be
launched, such as DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service),
Spam, Cryptocurrency Mining, etc. Compared to other Internet
malware, the major feature of a botnet is that it has a one-to-
many C&C channel. C&C channel is the essential component
of a botnet, which receives commands from botmaster and
forwards them to bots.
Traditional C&C channels are built using IRC, HTTP, P2P
and other protocols. With the evolution of Botnet detection,
construction of C&C channels pays more attention to con-
cealment and began to utilize some public services [29] such
as social network, cloud drive, online clipboard, disposable
E-mail, etc. Hammertoss (APT-29) [8] was reported to use
popular web services like Twitter and GitHub to publish con-
trol commands and hide communication traces. HeroRat [23]
used Telegram for C&C communication on Andriod devices.
In 2020, Turla [7] was reported to utilize Gmail to receive
commands and to exfiltrate information to the operators. These
kinds of C&C channels do not require attackers to deploy their
own servers, and defenders cannot shut down the whole botnet
by destroying the C&C servers.
However, the methods of constructing C&C channel using
Web platforms still have some deficiencies. To help bots find
btomaster, accounts information about botmaster (e.g. ids,
links, tokens, DGAs, etc.) have to hardcode into bots (see
Table I). Once bots are analyzed by adversaries, botmaster is
exposed and C&C activities can be monitored or interrupted.
Meanwhile, in most cases, commands are published in plain,
encoded or encrypted form (see Fig. 1). These abnormal
contents will expose C&C activities and raise anomalies on
OSNs, which may trigger restrictions on botmaster’s account
and interrupt C&C activities. When the hardcoded accounts are
blocked by OSNs, it is hard for bot to retrieve new commands
and recover the C&C channel. To build an anomaly-resistant
C&C communication on OSNs, Pantic et al. [18] proposed a
method that embeds commands into tweets using metadata of
tweets (length). The length of a tweet represents an ASCII
code in decimal. As a tweet has a maximum length of 140, 7
bits can be conveyed through one tweet. While commands can
be issued stealthily, the system has a low capacity. It needs to
post N tweets to publish a command in length of N.
These problems can be solved by introducing AI technology.
Artificial intelligence (AI) was firstly proposed in 1956 with
the goal of giving machines the ability to perceive, learn, think,
make decisions and act as human. AI has been widely applied
in various fields including cyber security. Lots of achievements
on malware monitoring, intrusion detection, situation analysis,
anti-fraud, etc. have reached with the integration of AI and
cyber security. With the help of technologies in AI, the
problems above can be solved.
Here is the main idea of this work. Botmaster posts con-
textual command-embedded contents on an OSN platform
first (we take Twitter and tweets as an example). Then bots
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TABLE I
CARRIERS FOR BUILDING C&C CHANNELS
Year Name OSNs Identity CMD
2009 upd4t3 [17] Twitter ID Base64
2012 - [22] Twitter Token Plain
2014 Garybot [21] Twitter Token Encrypted
2015 Hammertoss [8] Twitter DGA Plain
2015 MiniDuke [5] Twitter DGA Base64
2015 - [18] Twitter DGA Tweets
2017 ROKRAT [27] Twitter ID, Token Plain
2017 PlugX [14] Pastebin URL XOR
2018 Comnie [11] GitHub URL Base64, RC4
2019 DarkHydrus [6] GoogleDrive URL Plain
Fig. 1. Commands Posted by Hammertoss and MiniDuke
find botmaster through avatars with the help of a neural
network model, and parse command from botmaster’s tweets.
To achieve this, botmaster needs to train a neural network
model and prepares some pictures as future avatars, and
extracts feature vectors of the pictures through the trained
model. The vectors and model are distributed with bots. When
publishing a command, botmaster will choose some trending
topics synchronously with bots, generate contextual, readable
and command-embedded tweets using data augmentation and
hash collision, and post the tweets. Bots will crawl tweets
to the trending topic along with tweeters’ avatars, and then
identify botmaster by comparing the avatars and the selected
vector through the neural network model. If bots find their
master, command can be parsed by calculating the hashes
of the master’s tweets. Due to the poor explainability of
neural network models, it is difficult for adversaries to find
botmaster in advance even if the models and vectors are
leaked, which ensures the security of botmaster’s accounts.
Also, contextual tweets can eliminate the anomalies caused by
abnormal contents and conceal the intent of botmaster even if
the tweets are exposed to the public.
Our contributions are threefold:
• We introduce neural networks to solve the problem of
hardcoding in C&C communications. By using feature
vectors of avatars and an AI model, it is easy for bots
to find botmaster while hard for adversaries to locate
botmaster in advance.
• We propose a method to embed commands into natural
semantic tweets to avoid anomalies caused by abnormal
contents and conceal the intent of botmaster. Data aug-
mentation and hash collision are used in this process.
• We conduct experiments on Twitter to demonstrate the
feasibility of the proposed methods and analyze its ef-
ficiency, capacity and security. We also discuss possible
countermeasures to mitigate this kind of attack.
The combination of AI and cyber attacks is considered to
be a upward trend. We intent to provide a possible scenario
for security researchers and vendors to prevent this kind of
attack and prompt preparations in advance.
This remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II describes some relevant backgrounds about the techniques
in this work. Section III is the methodology for building the
covert C&C channel. Detailed implementations of different
parts are demonstrated in Section IV. Section V is the evalu-
ations on the experiments. Section VI contains the discussion
and related works to the paper. Conclusions are summarized
in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Siamese Neural Network
Siamese neural network [2] is effective in measuring simi-
larity between two inputs. The two inputs accepted by Siamese
neural network will feed into two identical neural networks to
generate two outputs. Like Siamese twins sharing same organs,
the identical neural networks share the same architecture and
weights. By calculating the distance of two outputs, similarity
between two inputs can be measured. If the distance is below
a threshold, it can be considered that they are similar. In
recent years, Siamese neural network is widely used for human
identification, object tracking, information retrieval, etc. [20]
Fig. 2 is an architecture of Siamese neural network. In
this work, the two identical neural networks are CNNs. CNN
(Convolutional Neural Network) [15] is one of the most pop-
ular neural networks and excels in speech recognition, image
recognition and segmentation, natural language processing,
etc. In this work, CNN is used to extract feature vectors of
avatars. Images input into CNN models will be converted into
vectors of the same length. Contrastive loss function [12] is
used to help backpropagate error and train the model.
Contrastive loss
Image1
Image2
CNN
CNN
Shared  weights
Fig. 2. Architecture of Siamese neural network
TABLE II
SENTENCES GENERATED BY EDA
Operation Sentence
None I shall certainly try to make my portraits as true to
life as possible.
SR I shall certainly try to make my portrayal as true to
life as possible.
RI I shall certainly try to make my portraits as true essay
to life as possible.
RS I shall possible try to make my portraits as true to
life as certainly.
RD I shall certainly try to my portraits as true to life as
possible.
SR: synonym replacement. RI: random insertion.
RS: random swap. RD: random deletion.
B. Text Data Augmentation
Data augmentation is a technique used in AI to solve the
problem of insufficient training data. Training neural networks
requires a lot of data. By applying data augmentation, re-
searchers can enlarge the existing dataset to meet the needs
of training works and promote the robustness and normalized
performances of neural network models.
In this work, botmaster needs to generate numerous tweets
for hash collision. Wei J. and Zou K. [28] proposed easy data
augmentation (EDA) techniques in 2019. They use Synonym
Replacement (SR), Random Insertion (RI), Random Swap
(RS) and Random Deletion (RD) to generate sentences with
similar meaning to the given sentences. Examples of EDA are
shown in Table II with an original sentence from [3].
The augmented sentences may not correct in syntax and
grammar, and may be vary in meaning. But the Internet is
diverse and inclusive, people have different options. Botmaster
should ensure the tweets have semantics but does not need
them to be “correct”.
C. Online Social Networks
Online Social Networks (OSNs) connect people across the
world. OSNs are open, creative, and portable. Users get access
to OSNs anywhere with a networked device. Everyone can
create, save and share contents in different forms (e.g. text,
images, videos, etc.) on OSNs, or forward and comment on
any contents they are interested in. Generally, visiting OSNs
is allowed by most antivirus software and network security
equipment like firewall. Data transmitted from OSNs to end
devices are encrypted and protected by TLS. These features
of OSNs guarantee content security during data transmission
and meet demands for building a good C&C channel.
Due to different considerations and privacy settings on
users’ profiles, statuses, etc., contents access permissions vary
on different OSNs. Some OSNs’ contents are limited only
to authenticated users while some have no restrictions that
everyone can access all contents in the platform. Table III is a
survey on contents access restrictions of Alexa top OSN sites.
Attackers can utilize the non-restricted parts to convey cus-
tomized information to others (including bots). In this work, to
demonstrate the feasibility of the methods, we choose Twitter
② Visit Twitter Trends ② Visit Twitter Trends
① Select a picture and set it as avatar ① Select a vector
⑤ Generate and post command-embedded 
tweets ④ Crawl tweets to the trend
⑤ Calculate distances of avatars to find botmaster
⑥ Decode tweets to get commands
③ Select a trending topic③ Select a trending topic
Pictures
Neural network model
Vectors
④ Crawl tweets to the trend
① Train neural 
network model
② Extract feature vectors 
from pictures ③ Publish bots with 
model and vectors
Prepare
Publish commands Get commands
Botmaster
Bot
Fig. 3. Workflow of botmaster and bot
to build the C&C channel. The commands are embedded in
tweets and posted by botmaster. The commands-embedded
tweets have natural semantic, so no abnormal contents are
posted on Twitter in this scenario, which also guarantees
behavioral security for botmaster.
III. APPROACH OVERVIEW
In this section we will introduce methodologies for building
a covert botnet C&C channel on OSNs.
A. Overall Workflow
As mentioned in Section I, in this work, botmaster needs
to train a neural network model to extract feature vectors
from some prepared images and distributes the vectors and
model with bots. For publishing a command, botmaster needs
to select some trending topics, generates and posts contextual
tweets. Bots need to crawl tweets to a topic, identify botmas-
ter’s account by avatars using the neural network model and
get command from tweets. Fig. 3 shows the workflow of the
process, which contains 3 stages.
1) Preparation: Botmaster gets bots ready for C&C activi-
ties in this stage. To this end, botmaster needs to prepare some
pictures as future Twitter avatars. Botmaster also needs to train
a neural network model to extract feature vectors from these
avatars (see Fig. 4). The high-dimensional features are built
into bots so that bots can identify botmaster accurately when
retrieving commands. Botmaster also needs to design a set of
rules for selecting avatars, vectors and Twitter trends. Bots are
built with the rules and distributed along with the vectors and
model. Each avatar and vector are used only once to prevent
the replay attack. After publishing a command, the Twitter
account is considered unsafe, and it is not recommended to
reuse the account. Therefore, botmaster also needs to maintain
some Twitter accounts for publishing commands multiple
times.
2) Publish Commands: In this stage, botmaster publish
commands on Twitter for bots to retrieve. Botmaster selects
an avatar and a trending topic according to the agreed rules
TABLE III
CONTENTS ACCESS RESTRICTIONS OF ALEXA TOP OSN SITES
OSN Profiles Posts Comments Pictures TrendsLogin Area All Login Area All Login Post All Compress Watermark Resize Login Area All
facebook.com N N C N N Y N Y Y Y N N -∗ - -
twitter.com N N Y N N C N Y C Y N N N R Y
instagram.com Y N Y Y N C Y Y Y Y N O Y N Y
weibo.com N N C N N C N Y Y Y Y Y N N Y
tumblr.com N N Y N N Y N Y C Y N Y N N Y
imgur.com N N Y N N Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y
pixnet.net N N C N N Y N Y Y Y N Y N N Y
pinterest.com Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y N N R Y N
∗ facebook.com does not provide trends.
Login – Login to view, Area – Area restrictions, All – All contents is available, Post – Login to post
Y – Yes, N – No, O – Occasionally, C – Customized by user, R – Restrictions that can be bypassed.
Pictures
Vectors
[0.06141704320907593, 0.11299607157707214, 
0.13662077486515045, -0.13357725739479065,
...
0.17597267031669617, -0.0214485302567482, 
0.04336101561784744, 0.07453791797161102]
[0.030405446887016296, 0.05502897500991821, 
0.14236226677894592, -0.12090344727039337,
...
0.10791455209255219, 0.018605416640639305, 
0.017460424453020096, 0.05878069996833801]
[0.06956829130649567, 0.09473420679569244,
0.15777051448822021, -0.1374780535697937,
...
0.14949743449687958, -0.0038978923112154007,
0.03145717829465866, 0.052630871534347534]
Input Output
Fig. 4. Extract Features using Neural Networks
with bots. Then botmaster crawls some tweets to the trending
topic and generates numerous sentences using EDA for hash
collisions to embed commands into tweets. After successful
collisions, botmaster posts the commands-embedded tweets on
Twitter.
3) Get Commands: Bots select a vector that represents
botmaster and a trending topic as agreed. Then bots crawl
tweets and tweeters’ avatars in the selected trend. After that,
bots will calculate the distances between crawled avatars and
the selected vector using the neural network model to identify
botmaster. If a distance is below the threshold, it is considered
that botmaster’s account is found. Bots will calculate hashes
of the tweets posted by botmaster to get commands.
B. Threat Model
In this work, we consider adversaries to be a third party
unrelated to attackers and OSNs. Adversaries have access
to the vectors from the prepared pictures and the structure,
weights, implementation and other detailed information of
the neural network model. Adversaries also have the abilities
to reverse engineer the bot program to obtain the detailed
implementation of bot.
C. Technical Design
1) Neural Network Model: A neural network model is used
to protect accounts of botmaster and conceal intent of bots, as
it is very difficult for adversaries to obtain the accounts in
advance even if they get the model and vectors. So with a
neural network model, the problem of hardcoding in current
works can be solved.
0.0035 < Threshold
0.5802 > Threshold
(a) botmaster use the model to extract feature vectors from pictures
(b) bots use the model to identify botmaster (if distance of inputs is 
below a threshold, botmaster is found)
(c) if distance is larger than the threshold, the input avatar does not 
belong to botmaster
Fig. 5. Usage of Neural Network Model
The model is used differently for botmaster and bots, as
shown in Fig. 5. For botmaster, the model can help to extract
features from avatars. Botmaster feeds the model with a batch
of pictures that will become avatars, and the model outputs a
batch of vectors that represent the pictures. Both the vectors
and the model are built into bots. For bots, the model is used
to calculate the distances between avatars from Twitter uses
and the built-in vectors to identify botmaster. A selected vector
and a crawled avatar are fed into the model, and the model
outputs the distance of the inputs. By comparing the distance
with a threshold, bots can identify whether the avatar is from
botmaster or not.
As pictures uploaded to OSNs gets compressed or resized,
avatar files are different from the original pictures. So the
model should have a good generalization ability that it can help
identify botmaster accurately and does not mistakenly identify
someone else as botmaster. To prevent replay and enhance
security, it is recommanded that each avatar and vector are
used only once. Botmaster will change the current account
and avatar when a command is issued. Bots will delete the
used vectors. During the experiments in this work, because
of the limited resources (Twitter accounts), we chose to reuse
one account to publish all the test tweets. It is good that there
is no third party to trace us back and there are no abnormal
contents produced and remained on Twitter.
2) Meeting Point for Botmaster and Bots: While bots
cannot find botmaster quickly among Twitter users without
hardcoded rules, Twitter trends provides a meeting point for
them. Twitter trends changes with the tweets volume under
different topics, and is updated every 5 minutes, which is
difficult to predict. Since ordinary users also discuss under
different topics, botmaster can hide itself among them. After
the selection of a trending topic and embedding of commands,
botmaster posts commands-embedded tweets to the trend. Bots
also select a trending topic according to the agreed rule and
crawl a lot of tweets along with tweeters’ avatars to the
trend. Then bots start identifying botmaster by its avatar. As
botmaster’s avatar is converted to a vector and distributed
with bots, bots can pick botmaster up quickly by comparing
distances using the neural network model.
3) Embedding of Commands: Content security and behav-
ioral security are of equal important in a covert communi-
cation. In previous works, when plain commands are posted
on Twitter, commands are known to all Twitter users, which
violates neither of the two principles above. When botmasters
post encoded or encrypted commands which ensures content
security, behavioral security is lost as accounts of botmasters
are exposed to others. Also, abnormal contents will raise
anomalies on OSNs. In this work, tweets posted by botmaster
are given natural semantic and donot contain strange charac-
ters, just like any other tweets. Also, any ordinary user on
Twitter can be botmaster if it sets the chosen avatar and posts
on specific trends at a specific time. Commands are embedded
into tweets generated by EDA through hash collision. The
commands-embedded tweets are posted by botmaster. When
bots identify botmaster, commands can be obtained by calcu-
lating hashes of the tweets.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed covert
C&C channel is feasible by presenting a proof of concept on
Twitter.
A. Twitter Avatars, Trends and API
In this work, bots try to find botmaster through avatars
using a neural network model. Twitter provides 4 different
sizes of avatars: normal (48x48), bigger (73x73), 200x200 and
400x400 (see Table IV). Links to these avatars of the same user
are similar, with the only difference lying on the sizes. Default
avatars returned by Twitter are in size of 48x48. According to
a preliminary experiment (described in Appendix A), of all 6
combinations of the 4 sizes, avatars in bigger sizes from the
same user have a smaller distance. So bots will use avatars in
size of 400x400 to identify botmaster. Bots can get links of
400x400 avatars by simply replace the suffix in the links.
TABLE IV
LINKS FOR DIFFERENT SIZE OF AVATARS OF THE SAME USER
Size Link
400x400 https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/94285847
9592554497/BbazLO9L_400x400.jpg
200x200 https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/94285847
9592554497/BbazLO9L_200x200.jpg
73x73 https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/94285847
9592554497/BbazLO9L_bigger.jpg
48x48 https://pbs.twimg.com/profile_images/94285847
9592554497/BbazLO9L_normal.jpg
In this experiments, Twitter APIs is used to get trends,
tweets and avatars for botmaster and bots. Twitter Trends API
returns top 50 topics in a chosen area specified by a location
ID (WOEID, Where on Earth ID). The default WOEID 1 is
for Trends from worldwide. There are detailed tweets volume
if the volume is bigger than 10, 000 over the past 24 h.
Botmaster can design a proper rule to select the trending topics
synchronously with bots to get enough tweets for EDA and
hash collision and hide in normal users. In the experiments, we
get trends from Johannesburg, South Africa (whose WEOID
is 1582504) by Twitter API and select the last trend above 10,
000 discussions from the returned trends.
Twitter Standard Search API is used to get tweets and
avatar links. We use the UTF-8, URL-encoded trending topics
as search queries. We set the language of returned tweets
to English and the amount to 100 in the query requests.
Tweets returned by API are sorted in order of post time from
near to far. Tweets’ status including ID, full text, language,
retweet status, create time, etc. and tweeter’s ID, name, profile
image url, following status, etc. are included in the response.
More details on Twitter APIs are listed on Twitter Developer
Documentation [25].
Since Twitter has limited the application for developer
account, attackers may not use Twitter API directly. There
are third parties that provide queries for Twitter contents,
including tweets, trends and user profiles. They can be utilized
by attackers for building the C&C communication between
botmaster and bots. Also, in a real botnet scenario, attackers
may write their own implementations that uses raw HTTP
requests to get the needed contents, although this would violate
Twitter Terms of Service (ToS) [24]. To not violate Twitter
ToS, we chose to use Twitter API in the experiments.
According to the ToS, all crawled contents for proof-of-
concept tests from Twitter (avatars and tweets) are deleted
within 24 hours. Contents for training and evaluation are
deleted after the tasks are completed. Contents crawled by
bots and botmaster are stored in computer memory and get
released after use.
B. Siamese Neural Network
1) Architecture: As mentioned above, CNN is used in the
Siamese network to extract features from images. Table V is
the architecture of CNN used in this work. It consists of 3
convolutional layers and 3 fully connected layers. Activation
functions between convolutional layers are Tanh, and between
TABLE V
ARCHITECTURE OF CNN
layer size-in size-out kernel
conv1 128×128×3 122×122×6 7×7×6, 1
Tanh
pool1 122×122×6 61×61×6 2×2×1, 2
conv2 61×61×6 56×56×16 6×6×16, 1
Tanh
pool2 56×56×16 28×28×16 2×2×1, 2
conv3 28×28×16 24×24×32 5×5×32, 1
Tanh
pool3 24×24×32 12×12×32 2×2×1, 2
conv4 12×12×32 8×8×48 5×5×48, 1
Tanh
pool4 8×8×48 4×4×48 2×2×1, 2
fc1 1×768×1 1×512×1
ReLU
fc2 1×512×1 1×256×1
ReLU
output 1x256×1 1×128×1
Size 2.36MB
fully connected layers are ReLU . To increase the uncertainty
of vector generation, we introduce a compression process of
the avatars. The avatars are 3-channel JPG or JPEG pictures,
and are resized to 128x128 before feeding into the model. The
CNN model accepts a 3-channel 128-pixel image as the input
and generates 128 outputs to make up a feature vector.
Inside of the SNN are 2 identical CNNs. During the training
process, SNN accepts 2 images as inputs and calculates the
distance of them. The 2 images will be converted into two
feature vectors by CNNs first. Then Euclidean distance of
the vectors is calculated to measure the similarity of the two
images. A smaller distance means a higher similarity between
the inputs.
We use Contrastive Loss Function promoted by Yann in
2006 [12] as the loss function of Siamese neural network. For
two image-inputs of the identical CNNs, Y is a binary label
assigned to the pair, where Y = 0 represents the images to
be similar, and Y = 1 if the images are different. G1 and G2
are two vectors generated by the identical CNNs. Let Dw =
‖G1 −G2‖ be the Euclidean distance between the vectors, w
be the weights of the network, m > 0 be a margin (radius
around G). The loss function is:
L = (1− Y )1
2
(Dw)
2 + Y
1
2
(max(0,m−Dw))2
2) Training: To train the model, we crawled avatars in
different sizes from 115, 887 Twitter users, and randomly
selected avatars from 19, 137 users to build the training and
test set. We choose avatars in size of 400x400 randomly to
make up input pairs with label 1. Due to the lack of original
pictures of the avatars, we use avatars in size of 200x200 and
400x400 from the same user to make up input pairs with label
0. The ratio of input pairs marked as 0 and 1 is 1:2. Finally we
got 19, 137 “same” image pairs and 38, 274 different image
pairs. We use 75% of them for training and 25% for testing.
Threshold for Euclidean distance is set to 0.02 (see Appendix
B). If the distance is lower than 0.02, two inputs are considered
to be similar; and if higher, they are considered to be different.
3) Performance: To test the performace, we conducted
the training process several times. This model converges fast
during training. After 10-20 epochs, 100% accuracy on test
set are obtained. The size of a trained Siamese neural network
model is 2.42MB. We use avatars from all 115, 887 users
to make up evaluation set, total in 463, 544 pairs (115, 887
pairs with label 0 and 347, 657 pairs with label 1, 1:3 in
ratio). Evaluations show that the model reaches an accuracy of
more than 99.999%, with only 2-4 pairs mislabeled. Different
from traditional machine learning works, we need to avoid the
hijacking of botmaster’s accounts, which means mislabeling
from 1 to 0 (not the same to the same) is forbidden while a
dab of mislabeling from 0 to 1 can be allowed. The original
labels of the mislabeled pairs are all 0, which means there
are no avatar collision happened with the trained models and
ensures the security for botmaster’s accounts.
C. Tweets Generation and Hash Collision
1) Commands: In this work, we take publishing an IP
address (of the C&C server) as an example to illustrate the
process of publishing commands. As tweets posted by bot-
masterhave natural semantic, information conveyed by a tweet
is limited and insufficient to launch an attack. So botmaster
can convey the address of a C&C server to bots. Detailed
payloads for a botnet campaign and updates of model and
vectors will be delivered through the server. For tasks that do
not need payloads (e.g. taking screen shot, reboot computer,
self destruction, etc.), commands can also be published in form
of an IP, as private IPs can be utilized here. For example, if
bots receive a public IP, they will connect to the IP and get
detailed payloads from C&C server. If bots receive an IP that
starts with 10 or 127, bots will decode the second byte of
the IP and get a number that represents a command. Also,
authentication between botmaster and bots is conducted on
the C&C server.
2) Hash Collision: Botmaster embeds command into
tweets by hash collision. To convey an IP address to bots
through tweets, botmaster splits the IP address into 2 parts
first, as shown in Fig. 6. Each part is expressed in hexadecimal.
For each generated tweet, botmaster calculates its hash and
compares whether the first 16 bits of the hash are identical
to one IP part. If two parts of an IP address are collided, a
successful hash collision is performed. Botmaster will post the
collided tweets in order. When bots identified botmaster, bots
will calculate the hashes of tweets posted by botmaster and
concatenate the first 2 bytes of hashes in order to get the IP
address. In this way, 16 bits can be conveyed in one tweet.
We do not recommend conveying a whole IP address at one
time, because it needs too much tweets to launch a successful
collision. Two 16 bits will reduce the calculation greatly.
3) Tweets Generation: To perform a successful collision,
botmaster needs numerous tweets. The new tweets are gen-
erated using EDA, as described in II-B. After the selection
of a trend, botmaster crawls tweets to the trend to generate
172.16.80.236
ac.10 . 50.ec
ac10 50ec
Hash(tweet_1) 
= ac103fb6...
Hash(tweet_2)
=50ec9ba0...
tweet_1 tweet_2
Fig. 6. Hash Collision
more sentences. In this experiments, 1K tweets are crawled
for each selected trend by Twitter API. Before we use the
crawled tweets to generate new sentences using EDA, we
need to have them cleaned first. As there are words deletion
and swap during augmentation, when a tweet is too short,
the generated sencences may not contain the trending words,
thus we filter out tweets with less than 10 words. Also, there
are retweeted tweets that do not contain the trending words,
we filter them out and just retain the original tweets. Then we
remove emojis, links, tabs, line breaks and punctuations except
“.”, “!”, “?” in each tweet. Duplicate tweets are removed at
last. Normally there are 400 to 900 tweets left. We use EDA to
generate 50 sentences for each tweet, which get us 20K to 45K
new sentences. This is still insufficient for hash collision. We
convert all sentences to upper case and add punctuations (“.”,
“..”, “...”, “!”, “!!” and “!!!”) at the end of each sentences. This
will result in 140K to more than 300K sentences in total, which
increases the success for hash collision greatly (see V-B2).
It is not deterministic for a successful hash collision. If
a collision fails, botmaster can add some noise (i.e. other
punctuations, etc.) to the sentences and try it again. When
more sentences are collided for one part, botmaster can pick
one up randomly or by preferences. Botmaster needs to post
the 2 final tweets in an order so that bots can recover the IP
address correctly.
V. EVALUATION
A. Experiments on Twitter
We use 7 virtual private servers in different areas (see
Table VI) to simulate bots around the world. We prepared 40
photos taken with mobile phones as avatars for botmaster’s
accounts. The photos were cut to size of 400x400 and con-
verted into vectors by a trained model. Bots are installed with
the model and vectors. In this experiment, bots and botmaster
select a trend once an hour. Botmaster posts the tweets in 5
minutes, and bots crawls related tweets 5 minutes after the
selection of the trend. Commands consists of IP addresses
TABLE VI
VPS DISTRIBUTION AND TIME COST FOR FINDING BOTMASTER
Location Time cost (s)
Region City Avg. Min. Max
South Asia Bangalore 81.51 34 267
East Asia Tokyo 14.59 5 36
Americas Toronto 16.56 6 60
Americas Virginia 12.13 5 23
Europe Amsterdam 15.19 6 27
Australia Sydney 35.26 12 292
Middle East Dubai 46.92 21 102
from the VPSs, private IPs and a threat report [10]. In this
experiment, each time botmaster completes a hash collision,
it is recorded to a log file. Each time the bots crawl a batch
of tweets, start and finish comparisons, they also recorded to
a log file. Afterwards, the logs were collected to compare the
post time with the retrieval time and also to match the original
commands with the decoded commands from bots. Due to the
time zone difference between botmaster and bots, the recorded
time was set to UTC time.
All commands in the experiments are received and parsed
correctly by bots. During the tests, botmaster completes tweets
collection, sentences generation and hash calculation in 13.8s
on average, and reaches a success rate at 90.28% for hash
collision. After the selection of a trend, bots try to crawl 1K
tweets and usually get 800-900 non-repeated tweets (for only
original tweets were saved for retweeted tweets). Bots need to
crawl the avatars of the users and compare the avatars with
the selected vector to calculate the distances and determine
whether botmaster is found. Due to different network and
device conditions, the time this process costs varies. The time
costs of bots finding botmaster are extracted from logs and
shown in Table VI. It takes at most 4.45 min to find botmaster
after the crawling of tweets among all bots. After bots obtained
the IPs, botmaster has posted tweets deleted.
B. Efficiency
1) Tweets Generation: To test the efficiency of tweets
generation for botmaster, we select 79 trends from 4 ran-
domly selected English-speaking areas around the world (San
Francisco, London, Sydney, and Johannesburg). 1K tweets are
crawled for each trend. Also, we have the crawled tweets
cleaned using the same method described in IV-C3 and
generated 50 new sentences using EDA for each remained
tweet. As keywords for trends,trending tpoics may contain
one or more words. With random deletion and random swap
adopted in EDA, keywords in topics may get deleted or
position changed in the new generated sentences. If botmaster
posts sentences without accurate keywords, bots cannot find
botmaster’s accounts from the crawled tweets with the trends.
Therefore, the quantity of sentences with keywords contained
are also recorded along with the quantity of all generated
sentences. The generation was conducted on an Ubuntu 18.04
x64 virtual server with 1GB ROM and 1 vCPU. In the 79
selected trends, 55 trends contain only one word and 24
contain more than one words. The results show that 89.54%
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Fig. 7. Efficiency of Tweets Generation
TABLE VII
GUIDELINE FOR EFFICIENCY OF TWEETS GENERATION
Time/s 1 2 3 5 10 15 20
Qty. 10262 14232 18202 26142 45993 65843 85694
Qty. 10K 20K 30K 50K 100K 150K 200K
Time/s 0.93 3.45 5.97 11.01 23.60 36.20 48.79
of the new generated sentences contain accurate keyword for
the 55 one-word trends and 77.55% contain accurate keywords
for the 24 more-words trends.
The efficiency and the quantity of sentences is linearly
related, as is shown in Fig. 7. Table VII is samples on how
many sentences can be generated in a given time and the time
cost for generating sentences of a given quantity. As mentioned
in IV-C3, EDA gets botmaster 20K to 45K sentences in this
experiment. According to this test, it costs 3 to 10 seconds to
generate the sentences. It is acceptable for botmaster preparing
sentences for hash collision.
2) Hash Collision: We use sentences generated above to
test the efficiency of hash collision. To prepare different
quantities of sentences, we also follow the method in IV-C3
that convert case and add punctuations at the end of each
sentence. For each trend, we get 4 batches of new sentences
incrementally by adding 2 conversions at a time. We also
collected 100 C&C server addresses as commands from the
threat report [10]. We call a batch of sentences “hit” an IP if
the batch succeed in hash collision for the IP. We use these new
batches of sentences and hashlib in Python 3.6.9 to calculate
hashes (SHA-256) on the same Ubuntu machine with single
thread and record the time costs and hit rate of hash collision
with different quantities of sentences.
As shown in Fig. 8, it takes less than 1 second to calculate
the hashes. In theory, 65, 536 (216) sentences will hit an IP,
which is ideal as hash collision is probabilistic. Experiment
shows that, there should be at least 200K sentences to get a
90% hit rate, and more than 330K for a nearly 100% hit rate.
As mentioned in IV-C3, there are usually 140K to more than
300K sentences for botmaster to perform a hash collision. This
will result in a hit rate of over 75%. During the experiments
on Twitter, botmaster gets an average of 219, 335 sentences
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Fig. 8. Time Costs and Hit Rate of Hash Collision
for hash collision each time and reaches a hit rate at 90.28%,
which is also acceptable for practical purposes.
3) Avatar Recognition: To test the efficiency of avatar
recognition by bots, we use the 40 vectors distributed with
bots and 1, 000 crawled avatars in size of 400x400 to calculate
the distances on the same Ubuntu machine as above. The
average time costs of extracting features from 1K avatars and
calculating 1K distances is 11.92s. This is also acceptable
for bots in such a hardware condition. In real scenarios, this
process may take longer as bots should have the avatars
crawled before recognition, which varies due to different
network situations.
C. Security
In this part, we will discuss the security risks from the
perspective of adversaries. Adversaries can 1) save avatars
from active botmasters for future use, 2) train a GAN with
the saved avatars to generate similar images, 3) reverse the
neural network model to derive an image that can produce a
similar vector, 4) collide a proper avatar using avatars from
real Twitter users, 5) attack the model to let bot make wrong
decisions on botmaster and 6) generate adversarial samples to
fool the model and bots.
1) Save Avatars From Botmasters: Even through it is hard
to guess the avatars used by botmasters, adversaries can mon-
itor behaviors of bots to identify botmasters. Adversaries may
save avatars used by botmasters. When the next appointed time
approaching, adversaries can also put on a new avatar, select
a trend and post tweets that contain fake commands. But this
does not work in this scenario because each avatar and vector
are used only once. After a command is issued, the current
avatar becomes invalid, because the corresponding vector are
deleted by bots. Even if adversaries put on botmaster’s avatars,
it still cannot be recognized by bots.
2) Train a GAN: Adversaries can train a GAN with saved
avatars to generate similar images. But it is also not realistic.
The avatars from botmasters are not just human faces. They
can be anything, such as animals, sceneries, cars, plants, arts,
etc. Also, training a GAN needs numerous data. Avatars from
botmasters are serious insufficient to build a training dataset.
So it is also impossible to hijack botmaster in this way.
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Fig. 9. Values of Vectors
3) Reverse the Model: As adversaries can get vectors and
neural network model from bots, adversaries can try to recover
and derive a similar image to cheat bots. CNN makes the
protection possible. Neural network models can get excellent
accuracy in different tasks but they have a poor explainability
[9]. It is not clear how neural networks make decisions, and
is also impossible to reverse a neural network model. CNN
learns abstract features from raw images. Each CNN hidden
layer integrates the output of the previous layer to output a
higher degree of abstraction, and thus different layers learn
different levels of abstraction. As layers get deeper, much
of information in the original image is lost. This makes it
impossible to recover the original image or derive a similar
one based on the vectors and the model.
4) Collide an Avatar: Adversaries may try to collide for
an avatar. It sounds possible but is hard. We analyzed the
composition of the vectors. The 40 vectors mentioned above
contain 5120 numbers. We have the numbers sorted from small
to large and put into the coordinate system, as is shown in
Fig. 9. The numbers constitute a continuous interval from -
0.350 to 0.264. Fig. 10 is the distribution of the numbers.
Although the numbers follow a normal distribution, each value
in the vector of length 128 is still taken from a continuous
interval, which is a huge space and is impossible to enumerate
or collide. This make sure the security of botmaster’s avatars
and vectors.
Even though, we still tried a collision for avatars. We made
more than 0.6 billion calculations on the distances between
pairs of the crawled 115, 887 avatars. There are 2050 pairs
that have a distance below the 0.02 (0.00031%), of which 81
pairs below 0.01 (0.000012%). By analyzing these pictures,
we found they share the same style that they all have a large
solid color background, especially white background (mainly
logos) (see Fig. 11). As avatars are prepared by botmasters,
they can avoid this type of pictures. It is also recommended
that botmasters use colorful pictures taken by their cameras
instead of pictures from Internet.
5) Attack the Model: Adversaries can attack the neural
network model to let bots make wrong decision on botmaster.
This is possible as there are some works that trojan attack
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Fig. 11. A Group of Avatars that Have Distances Below 0.02
neural networks [16]. It may affect one bot but do not
influences the whole botnet. Other unaffected bots can still
make right decisions on botmaster.
6) Generate Adversarial Samples: As the model and fea-
ture vectors are known to adversaries, it is a white-box non-
targeted adversarial attack in this scenario. Adversaries can
generate an adversarial sample to fool the model and bots.
Adversarial attacks aim at a misclassification on original
target, but it is not a classification task in this scenario.
Although there are 128 outputs of CNN, there are not 128
classes of targets. A slightly perturbation on feature vector
will result in a distance higher than threshold. Therefore, it is
also hard to attack the botnet.
Even through adversaries happened to get an image that
produce a similar vector, the size of botnet can be seized,
but they still cannot take over the botnet, as there are au-
thentications between botmaster and bots on the C&C server
(like [26]). A cryptography authentication is mandatory to
ensure the security of C&C communication. All connections,
commands and payloads between bots and C&C server are
protected by asymmetric key pairs. That is impossible to break
with the current computing capacity.
VI. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORKS
A. Countermeasures
In this part we talk about possible countermeasures to
mitigate this botnet.
As shown in Table III, there are many fields in an OSN
that could be utilized to convey customized contents to others.
These features of OSNs provide convenience for normal users
to browse the Internet but can also be utilized by malicious
users. OSNs can mitigate this attack by limiting the contents
that can be viewed anonymously. In this way, normal users can
also browse anything they like, while bots may not retrieve
the tweets posted by botmaster. This maintains openness
and improves security on OSNs. In addition, as mentioned
before, the proposed botnet also suffers from the risk of being
measured.
Traditional malware detection methods such as behavior
analysis can also be applied in this case. There are some
periodical behaviors of bots. Bots need to visit Twitter Trends
periodically. After the selection of a trending topic, bots need
to crawl tweets to find botmaster. When identifying botmaster,
bots also need to crawl avatars from Twitter. These series of
operations can form a behavioral patten of bots. Therefore, in
this way, botnet activities can be detected.
As AI can be used to launch cyber attacks, security vendors
should also take the malicious use of AI into consideration so
that the attacks can be detected when they are applied in real
scenarios in the future.
B. Related Works
In this work, bots find botmaster using Twitter Trend, and
botmaster publishes commands by natural semantic tweets.
As a proof of concept work, parameters in this work are
conservative. In fact, to enhance security, the length of vectors
can be longer than 128. It will make the collision for avatars
even more impossible. Also, threshold for distances of avatars
and vectors can be lower than 0.02, as the undistributed avatars
and the distances are within the authority of botmaster and can
be customized by botmaster.
As shown in Table III and discussions above, other fields
in OSN can also be utilized before the measures are taken.
For instance, botmaster could post anything on a trend, or
comment anything on a tweet. Bots recognize botmaster by its
avatar and get commands from the profiles of botmaster. Other
platforms like Weibo, Tumblr are also capable of command
and control in this way.
This work provides a new point on malicious use of AI.
There are many works that discuss the combination of AI
and attacks. In 2017, MalGAN [13] was proposed to generate
adversarial malware examples that were able to bypass black-
box machine learning based detection models. A generative
network is trained to minimize the generated adversarial exam-
ples’ malicious probabilities predicted by black-box malware
detector.
In 2018, DeepLocker [4] was proposed by researchers
from IBM to carry out targeted attacks in a stealthy way.
DeepLocker trains the target attributes and a secret key to-
gether into an AI model, embeds the AI model and encrypted
malicious code into benign applications. Target detection is
conducted by the AI model that when input attributes match
target attributes, the secret key will be derived from the AI
model to decrypt the payload and launch attacks on the target;
if not match, the intent of the malicious code are concealed
as no decryption key is available.
Rigaki [19] proposed to use GAN to mimic Facebook
chat traffic to make C&C communication undetectable. In
both their work and our work, AI is used to build a covert
communication. They use GAN to mimic OSNs traffic because
it is harder to detect. While in our work there is no need to
mimic OSNs traffic, as all traffic here is from real OSNs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we discussed a novel covert command and
control channel on OSNs by introducing AI technologies. Bots
find botmaster by a group of feature vectors from avatars
instead of usernames, links, tokens or DGA. Botmaster use a
Siamese neural network model to extract feature vectors from
pictures. Bots use the same model to identify botmaster by cal-
culating the distance between feature vectors and avatars from
Twitter users. One account is considered as botmaster if the
distance is below a threshold. To eliminate abnormal contents
and improve behavioral security, commands are embedded into
semantic tweets by hash collision. Easy data augmentation is
used to generate large quantities of tweets for hash collision.
Experiments on Twitter shows that this method is feasible as
all commands are conveyed to bots successfully within an
acceptable time and without anomalies.
This paper shows that AI is also capable of cyber attacks.
With the popularity of AI, AI-powered cyber attacks will
emerge and bring new challenges for cyber security. Cyber
attack and defense are interdependent. We believe countermea-
sures against AI attacks will be applied in future computer
systems, and protection for computer systems will be more
intelligent. We hope the proposed scenario will contribute to
future protection efforts.
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TABLE VIII
ARCHITECTURE OF CNN
layer size-in size-out kernel param
conv1 32×32×3 28×28×6 5×5×6, 1 8K
ReLU
pool1 28×28×6 14×14×6 2×2×1, 2 0
conv2 14×14×6 10×10×16 5×5×16, 1 3K
Sigmoid
pool2 10×10×16 5×5×16 2×2×1, 2 0
fc1 1×400×1 1×256×1 103K
Sigmoid
fc2 1×256×1 1×192×1 49K
ReLU
output 1×192×1 1×128×1 25K
total 188K
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APPENDIX
A. Selection on Avatar Size
As mentioned in IV-A, Twitter offers 4 different size of
avatars (48x48, 73x73, 200x200 and 400x400). We need to
use avatars from the same user to make up the training set
with label 0. There are 6 combinations of the 4 sizes. To better
serve training set, an avatars combination should have a shorter
distance as they come from the same user. Therefore, 256
avatars from 64 users are selected to calculate the distances
using a CNN modified on LeNet (see Table VIII).
256 vectors are extracted from the avatars by the CNN
with random weights. For each user, there are 4 vectors that
represent 4 different size of avatars. Then Euclidean distances
of different vectors from the same user are calculated. Now
there are 6 distances for each user. For simplicity, we use
Dn_m to represent the distance between avatars in size of n×n
and m×m. The experiment was repeated for 14 times with 14
different random weights for CNN.
Fig. 12 shows the 14 average distances of the 6 size
combinations. It indicates that when one avatar is fixed in
size, a smaller size gap gain smaller distances (see (D400_200,
D200_73, D200_48), (D400_73, D200_73, D73_48) for instance),
and avatars with bigger size gain smaller distances (see
(D200_48, D200_73), (D400_200, D73_48) for instance). There-
fore, avatars in size of 200x200 and 400x400 are used in
the training set as they have the shortest distance of all the
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Fig. 13. Threshold for Distance
combinations, and avatars in size of 400x400 are used by bots
to find botmaster.
B. Threshold for Distance
A threshold is needed to determine whether two avatars
share the same source. We use a trained model to calculate
the distances on evaluation set, which contains 115, 887 pairs
with label 0 and 347, 657 pairs with label 1. We record
the distances of every comparison, sort them by value and
label, and count the frequency of them to learn the boundary
between the "same" avatars and different avatars. As is shown
in Fig. 13, the distances of all pairs with label 1 and only 4
pairs with label 0 are larger than 0.02, and the remained pairs
with label 0 are less than 0.02. It shows that 0.02 is a proper
threshold to the determination. In real scenarios, botmaster can
choose a threshold less than 0.02, as the undistributed avatars
and distances are within the authority of botmaster.
